INTERNET UTOPIANISM AND THE PRACTICAL
INEVITABILITY OF LAW
JULIE E. COHEN

INTRODUCTION
Writing at the dawn of the digital era, John Perry Barlow
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom. Addressing
the nations of the world, he cautioned that their laws, which were “based
on matter,” simply did not speak to conduct in the new virtual realm.1 As
both Barlow and the cyberlaw scholars who took up his call recognized,
that was not so much a statement of fact as it was an exercise in
deliberate utopianism. But it has proved prescient in a way that they
certainly did not intend. The “laws” that increasingly have no meaning in
online environments include not only the mandates of market regulators
but also the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights of
internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms
whose supremacy Barlow asserted. More generally, in the networked
information era, protections for fundamental human rights—both on- and
offline—have begun to fail comprehensively.
Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it also
hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay, adapted from a
forthcoming book on the evolution of legal institutions in the information
era,2 I identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: utopianism
about platforms for distributed cultural and political production (and
concomitant failure to reckon with the transformative force of
informational capitalism); utopianism about anonymity as a force for
institutional disruption (and concomitant failure to acknowledge the
essential role of institutions in cabining the human capacity for malice
and mayhem); and utopianism about the relationship between
information and communication networks and human freedom (and
concomitant failure to contend with the powerful and inherently
informational mechanisms by which existing protections for human
rights are increasingly outflanked and coopted). It has become
increasingly apparent that functioning legal institutions have
1
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indispensable roles to play in protecting and advancing human freedom.
It has also become increasingly apparent, however, that the legal
institutions we need are different than the ones we have.

I. THE PLATFORMIZATION OF EVERYTHING:
DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION, DATA PRIVACY, AND THE
PROBLEM OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM
Some of the scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call
prophesied that decentralized coordination of cultural and political
activity by networked communities of peers would increasingly displace
centralized, top-down control of cultural and political production, with
transformative and broadly freedom-promoting effects.3 Without
question, decentralized production strategies have expanded access to
information and political capacity-building for people all around the
world and have come to be regarded as essential tools for fostering
human freedom in the networked information era. The grander visions of
wholesale, democratizing transformation in political economy and in
government have not materialized, however. Instead, strategies for
decentralized cultural and political production have fueled a very
different kind of transformation, organized around the emergence of
dominant global platforms that afford new vantage points for
surveillance, data harvesting, surplus extraction, and manipulation.
Some of the obstacles to commons-based cultural and political
production were predictable. Leading software firms initially waged
public and creative campaigns against open source software, labeling it
unreliable, insecure, and a point of entry for organized crime. Although
open source products and accompanying services eventually achieved
widespread penetration in certain industry sectors and some onceformidable opponents have become adherents, persistent, thorny issues
continue to surround the interfaces between open source and proprietary
systems and modules.4 The major content industries have resisted
3
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commons-based production and open-access distribution strategies for
educational and cultural materials and have devised a continuing stream
of legal and technological methods for asserting control over their
products and business models.5 Political activists, for their part, quickly
learned that the networked digital information environment afforded not
only unprecedented scope for dissent and resistance but also new, hidden
control points for state censorship and surveillance.6
Other failure modes for commons-based production were wholly
unanticipated, and that was so in part because internet utopian projects
elevated openness and freedom from control over all other priorities,
most notably including privacy and data protection. Evangelists for
internet openness, confident in the ability of enlightened netizens to
assert their own privacy interests, painted calls for stricter regulation as
threats to the net’s most fundamental values.7 But openness has proved a
double-edged sword. The allure of open content models has been a
powerful factor driving the emergence of new information businesses
whose revenue models are based on harvesting and monetizing the data
flows generated by content developers and content users, including
global platform giants Google, Facebook, and Amazon and a host of

5
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others.8 Platform protocols invite commons-based production
arrangements, and commons-based production arrangements in turn
reinforce platform logics of data harvesting and proprietary, algorithmic
knowledge production.9
The results of distributed cultural and political production also
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the contrary
have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. The particular
quality-control mechanisms that keep open source software robust and
secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) objective work far less well
(or not at all) within massively-intermediated environments that are
optimized to advertiser-driven platform revenue models. In such
environments, the vaunted “wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector.
Algorithmic processes optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt
social sharing heighten the volatility of online interactions, and
surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content
targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful—and easily
weaponized—stimulus-response feedback loops.10 The result is a
sociotechnical apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and
deepening preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.
Under conditions of pervasive, data-driven intermediation—
enabled in part by thought leaders’ failure to take privacy and data
protection seriously as worthy and freedom-advancing projects—power
from below becomes power directed toward whatever purpose its
organizers want to advance. Platform-based, massively-intermediated
environments have become fertile breeding grounds for conspiracy
theories (including coordinated campaigns to foster denialism about
climate change, vaccination, and similar matters), disinformation
campaigns designed to discredit political actors and institutions, and
virulent forms of bigotry, ideological extremism, and ethnic
8
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nationalism.11 At the same time, and paradoxically, the increasingly
pronounced orientation toward manufactured outrage and political
polarization within such environments also dissipates other kinds of
political energy. It has become more difficult to enlist networked publics
in the work of building movements capable of growing, sustaining
themselves, and organizing for change in the real world.12
Among scholars and commentators who write about digital
media, a debate has raged about whether it is fair to blame dominant
platforms for these problems. According to media scholar Siva
Vaidhyanathan, “the problem with Facebook is Facebook,” and more
specifically the combination of Facebook’s global reach, its
optimization-based business model, and the ways that its information
feeds have displaced other, potentially moderating sources of
information.13 Others argue that such explanations unfairly blame
platforms for longstanding dysfunctions that are not of their creation.14
Without question, part of the problem with Facebook and others is the
preexisting social and cultural divisions that information cascades
amplify. That logic, though, undercuts the optimism about bottom-up
organization that the Internet’s founding visionaries expressed. Part of
the problem with Facebook and other platforms is people, easily
distracted, highly susceptible to misinformation, and prone to herd
behavior. It also undercuts the logic that designated the internet and its
networked virtual spaces as sites of utopian separation for the life of the
mind. Platform-based environments are inextricably embedded in realworld societies; platform governance requires real-world, institutional
(i.e., non-utopian) solutions.
11
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II. UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS:
ANONYMITY, TRUST AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE
Other scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call focused
on enabling capabilities for distributed, anonymous communication and
coordination, and here again the scorecard is mixed. It is indisputable
that anonymity has played an essential structural role in modern
democratic societies and equally indisputable that networked information
and communication technologies have provided anonymous dissenters
with invaluable tools for naming and challenging abuses of economic
and political power. Around the world, both activists pursuing social
change and journalists reporting on controversial topics now rely on
capabilities for anonymous, networked communication to protect
themselves and their sources, and projects dedicated to creating,
maintaining, and improving such capabilities have become sites of
ongoing research and activism in their own right.15 Persistent and
intractable questions remain, however, about the extent to which
behaviors that historically have functioned as safety valves within more
complex institutional structures can assume more central roles in the
project of securing fundamental rights and freedoms for all people.
To begin with, and continuing the themes developed in the
previous section, anonymous online activity has valences that are more
complicated than romanticized narratives equating anonymity with press
freedom and democratic self-determination acknowledge. The projects of
building and sustaining utopia require utopians—people united in their
unequivocal commitment to the ground truths and operating norms of a
utopian project. Some utopian ground truths and operating norms are
ugly and unworthy of anyone’s allegiance. In networked spaces, cadres
of technological cognoscenti wield anonymity as a new and potent
source of social and political power to be deployed toward a wide variety
of ends. They orchestrate large-scale whistleblowing, operate safe
channels for journalists, and distribute samizdat on behalf of political
dissidents—and also spread hate speech, disinformation, and fascist and
nationalist ideologies.

15

See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 227–37; Eva Galperin, Cell Phone Guide
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More generally, the trajectories of projects designed to scale up
certain types of anonymous interaction and communication demonstrate
that breaking things is easier than rebuilding them. Consider two muchdiscussed examples involving anonymous infrastructures for enabling
fundamental market and governance functions. The first is the
blockchain, a set of technological protocols for enabling distributed,
secure authentication of transactions and credentials. In theory, such
technologies might be deployed within existing institutional fabrics in
ways that eliminate opportunities for corruption, waste, and rentseeking.16 But uses for private surplus extraction and self-interested (and
environmentally destructive) speculation are far more widespread, and
some argue that the highest and best uses of blockchain technologies
involve the creation of alternative currencies to displace state-sponsored
fiat currency and ultimately the state itself.17 The second example is
WikiLeaks, which rapidly attained heroic status among civil liberties
advocates for its stated commitment to facilitating anonymous
whistleblowing about powerful wrongdoers. WikiLeaks, however, is not
a free press advocacy organization. It rejects certain essential editorial
and quality control functions that the press as an institution typically has
performed and espouses an endgame that is far more disruptive.18
WikiLeaks’ evolving role in the era of ascendant platform-based
disinformation campaigns is proof that the distinction matters.19
16
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As both of those examples illustrate, moreover, other obstacles
to coding scalable, anonymity-centered, democratic institutions are
cultural. As Gabriella Coleman has shown, hacker culture speaks the
intertwined languages of liberal individualism and libertarianism and
posits enlightened self-reliance and, by necessary implication, technical
meritocracy as cardinal virtues.20 Those commitments in turn complicate
efforts to transform digital anonymity from a tool for resistance to the
foundation of a stable framework for guaranteeing fundamental rights
and freedoms. Understood as (anti-)institutional projects, both
WikiLeaks and blockchain-based cryptocurrency projects reflect
ideologies that are powerfully utopian but not particularly democratic.
They express and reproduce a particular kind of moral and ideological
purity that is inconsistent with a broadly inclusive social compact. And
they illustrate powerfully that, although capabilities for anonymous
online communication and coordination have played and will continue to
play an important role in efforts to secure fundamental rights and
freedoms for all people, such capabilities cannot stand in for other kinds
of institution-building. Structurally speaking, anonymous dissent and
opposition are safety valves. Achieving durable, effective protection for
fundamental rights and freedoms also requires other mechanisms.

III. UNRAVELING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER
Both strands of utopian thinking about internet-enabled
governance that I have just described are rooted in a more general habit
of utopian thinking about the relationship between information and
human freedom. That habit is deeply ahistorical. Networked information
technologies are not simply instruments of liberation, nor do they simply
afford new avenues for control and cooptation. Over the course of many
decades, social and legal institutions have come to reflect the shaping
influence of the “control revolution” that began with the introduction of
automated information systems into industrial-era factories and

https://perma.cc/W3HT-RMV5; see also Andy Greenberg, How Reporters
Pulled Off The Panama Papers, The Biggest Leak in Whistleblower History,
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/WJF9-EUMP (describing investigative
journalists’ use of encryption tools to coordinate a controlled leak of documents
detailing a massive scheme for global tax evasion).
20
See generally GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER,
SPY: THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMOUS (2014); GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING
FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF HACKING 183–205 (2012).
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businesses.21 The processes of institutional evolution have produced new
institutional configurations and competencies that are intensively
informational in character and that have posed difficult challenges for
traditional approaches to conceptualizing and enforcing fundamental
human rights.
The same networked capabilities that enable widespread public
access to information also have enabled powerful corporate entities to
build and manage far-flung global empires. As a practical matter, such
entities wield increasing power over the conditions of human freedom.
Giant transnational corporations that construct global networked supply
chains enjoy nearly unlimited authority over their workers and outsize
influence over the surrounding communities. The state-centered human
rights discourses and institutions that emerged in the post-World War II
era did not contemplate such rearrangements, and both powerful
economic actors and the developed economies of the Global North have
resisted reform efforts that might bring transnational norms and domestic
constitutional obligations to bear directly on private economic activity.22
In the U.S., at least, the direction of constitutional reform has run the
other way.23
Capabilities for networked digital communication and for highly
informationalized, managerial oversight also have catalyzed profound
changes in the structure and operation of regulatory and governance
institutions, and those changes have unfolded in ways that have
accelerated the marginalization of human rights commitments. The
increasing power and prominence of network-and-standard-based legalinstitutional arrangements for economic governance—arrangements that
exist to facilitate global flows of extractive activity and that tend to treat
protective regulation as network damage—has left older human rights
institutions increasingly sidelined.24 Meanwhile, as emergent human
rights discourses and practices organized around capabilities for human
flourishing and sustainable development have encountered and engaged
21

See generally JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION:
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
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23
See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
24
On network-and-standard-based governance arrangements, see Julie E. Cohen,
Networks, Standards, and Network-and-Standard-Based Governance, in AFTER
THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach, ed., forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339351.
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with economic governance arrangements, they have become increasingly
expert-driven and inaccessible to the populations whose futures they
affect. In particular, activists and advocates have raised persistent
concerns about the methodological tyranny of utilitarianism in the
articulation of development goals and benchmarks.25 Efforts to reorient
human rights discourse and practice toward the problem of private
economic power also have undergone a novel form of institutional
cooptation that relocates those efforts inside corporations themselves and
restyles them as “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practice.
Initiatives such as the UN Global Compact rely on hortatory strategies to
extract commitments that may or may not be honored and project an
image of consensus around gradual forward progress that may or may
not correspond to reality.26
The powerful global platform businesses that have emerged in
the twenty-first century did not cause any of these changes, but they have
proved apt at exploiting them. So, for example, as the European Union
has worked to export its high standards for personal data protection to the
rest of the world, U.S. platform businesses have supported efforts to
insert strengthened mandates for cross-border flow into bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements, including especially agreements involving
the Asian nations that are increasingly significant players in the emerging
cross-border data servicing economy.27 Platform businesses also have
taken an entrepreneurial approach to the CSR movement. The Global
Network Initiative, founded in 2008 by a coalition of platform firms,
academics, and human rights NGOs, represented an attempt both to
25

See Sally Engle Merry & John M. Conley, Measuring the World: Indicators,
Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83
(2011); AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators:
Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253 (2009). See generally
KEVIN E. DAVIS, ANGELINA FISHER, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, EDS., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).
26
See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John
Ruggie); The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://perma.cc/5LZV-AJYY (last accessed June 26, 2018);
KHOURY & WHYTE, supra note 22, at 48–61.
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See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free
Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA
PROTECTION L. REV. 191 (2016); Graham Greenleaf, Free Trade Agreements
and Data Privacy: Future Perils of Faustian Bargains, in TRANSATLANTIC
DATA PRIVACY RELATIONS AS A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY 181–212 (Dan
Svantesson & Dariusz Kloza eds., 2017).
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coordinate resistance to censorship demands by authoritarian states and
to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding to such
demands.28 Compliance with the GNI’s principles, however, remains
voluntary and inconsistent, even as the vast and growing extent of
commercial surveillance—encompassing information of an astonishing
variety, granularity, and intimacy—deepens the symbiosis between
public and private surveillance power.29
Last but not least, data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply
both obstacles to accountability and opportunities for cooptation of
accountability structures. Smart digital technologies produce decisions
that are ad hoc, personalized, and pattern-based rather than principled
and generalizable. They don’t give reasons for—or even draw attention
to—the choices they make, and those choices are continually evolving.
The design of automated machine-learning processes also includes a
number of steps that scrutiny of their end results does not capture.30
Those attributes sit in profound tension with traditional articulations of
the institutional features that a commitment to the rule of law requires,
and they create oversight problems that extend far outside the traditional
competencies of courts.31 And here again, efforts to devise new oversight
mechanisms have offered new avenues for the assertion and reproduction
of informational power: Consider, for example, the Federal Trade
Commission’s privacy and data security consent decrees, which rely
heavily on attestations of compliance by private sector auditors that are
28

GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL NETWORK
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https://perma.cc/ERY2-Z44L; Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle,
The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, CTR.
ON PRIVACY AND TECH., GEORGETOWN LAW (Oct. 18, 2016),
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Experimented with Predictive Policing Software, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 6,
2019), https://perma.cc/ZY4B-HDCH; Tim Cushing, Cops Wanting To Track
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Records, TECHDIRT (Mar. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/3K3Z-T8P9.
30
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See generally MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 133–56,
174–85 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 1, (2019).
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largely unverifiable and that bootstrap self-defined standards of
adequacy.32 Or consider emergent regimes for “content moderation at
scale,” which rely on a combination of privatized algorithmic governance
and standardized performance reporting as a means of demonstrating
compliance to the outside world.33 Both developments reflect beliefs
about the best uses of new informational capabilities to manage legal and
regulatory processes; neither expresses a commitment to robust public
accountability.

CONCLUSION
None of the problems I have described, of course, is Barlow’s
fault. But those who would advance the intertwined projects of human
freedom and democratic self-government should choose their prophets
carefully—or, perhaps, should not place their faith in prophets at all.
Advancing human freedom through the absence of law was never really
in the cards. The difficulty, rather, is that the information-era problems
now requiring institutional solutions are profoundly unfamiliar to
institutional actors whose established modes of both action and selflegitimation are backward-looking. New informational capabilities
demand both new governance modalities and new institutional
arrangements capable of deploying them effectively. Due in part to hardto-break habits of framing such questions as anti-openness, antiinnovation, or conducive to censorship (or, more usually, all three), we
still have vanishingly little idea what such capabilities and structures
might look like and how they might be conformed in some recognizable
way to rule-of-law ideals. Those are urgent projects for a post-utopian
era.

32

See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); Megan Gray, Understanding
and Improving Privacy Audits under FTC Orders (May 5, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165143.
33
See generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE
SOCIAL MEDIA (2018).

